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Chapter 2
Commentary on Chy Lung v. Freeman
Julie Dahlstrom

Although often an overlooked Supreme Court decision, Chy Lung v. Freeman played a
significant role in contributing to the growth of federal immigration power that took root in the socalled Chinese Exclusion cases of the late nineteenth century.1 In Chy Lung, the Supreme Court
struck down a patently racist and gendered California law that had allowed officials to exclude
Chinese female passengers found to be “lewd” and “debauched” from entering into the United
States.2 In the decision, Justice Samuel Miller, writing for the unanimous Supreme Court,
expressed grave concerns about state corruption and the abuse of power at the border.3 In
particular, Justice Miller worried that this California law granted officials excessive power to label
any Chinese woman “lewd” and prevent them entry into the United States. To mitigate these
concerns, the Court held that the federal government, not the states, should retain the exclusive
power to make laws related to immigration and foreign relations. Over a century later, the Chy
Lung decision still provides an important window into how immigration officials have historically
exercised discretion at the intersections of race and gender. Indeed, the Chy Lung decision
exemplified how the Supreme Court could have—but did not—respond to similarly discriminatory
federal exclusion laws aimed at Chinese immigrants.4

1

Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875); see, e.g., Gerald Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration
Law, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1887 (1993) (examining the series of exclusionary laws passed by Congress in 1882
to bar Chinese workers from entry into the United States).
2
Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 277.
3
Id. at 280.
4
Immigration Act of 1882, 22 Stat. 214 (Aug. 3, 1882) (establishing race-based exclusion measures aimed at
Chinese immigrants); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (rejecting challenge to the Chinese
Exclusion Act and deferring to plenary power as basis for federal government’s authority to establish immigration
policy).
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Professor Stewart Chang’s feminist opinion provides a different vision of Chy Lung, one
firmly grounded in the application of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1870.5
Professor Chang artfully explores how the Court might have fully acknowledged the realities of
race, gender, and class that animated the California law. The feminist judgment provides a
constitutional and statutory framework grounded in equal protection and due process, which,
unlike the Court’s approach, offers more enduring solutions for immigrant litigants at the border,
and indeed in deportation cases as well. Ultimately, the Court failed to adopt Professor Chang’s
reasoning. Thus, the real legacy of Chy Lung and its progeny, sadly, is one of rising federal
immigration power, extreme judicial deference, and persistent anti-Chinese racism: forces that
would continue to sustain harsh immigration measures at the border and within the United States.

Case Background

Chinese immigration was a key tool to maintain white supremacy after the Civil War. As
slavery came to an end, wealthy white southerners faced a shortage of workers and turned to
Chinese immigrants, whom they believed would offer a cheaper source of labor to exploit.6 At the
same time, the Burlingame-Seward Treaty of 1868 opened up new pathways for labor migration
from China to the United States. The Treaty provided that Chinese immigrants would enjoy “the

5

U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, §§ 16-17, 16 Stat. 140, 144.
Mae Ngai, Racism Has Always Been Part of the Asian American Experience, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 21, 2021);
ANDREW GYORY, CLOSING THE GATE: RACE, POLITICS, AND THE CHINESE EXCLUSION ACT 39 (1998); Kathleen
Kim, The Thirteenth Amendment and Human Trafficking: Lessons and Limitations, 36 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1005,
1009 (2020) (“When outright state-sanctioned slavery was abolished, plantation owners and other industries took
advantage of Black Codes and peonage contracts to coerce the labor of newly freed slaves and recently arriving
Mexican and Chinese ‘coolie’ workers.”).
6
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same privileges, immunities, and exemptions in respect to travel or residence” and encouraged
Chinese workers to immigrate.7
However, the words of the Burlingame-Seward Treaty stood in stark contrast to the realities
of violence and oppression that most Chinese immigrants found upon entry. In California, for
example, many Chinese laborers faced rampant discrimination, exploitation, and violence.
California legislators were openly hostile towards Chinese immigrants, using racist rhetoric to
support discriminatory legislation. They argued that Chinese immigrants could not assimilate, took
jobs from white laborers, and were a race of “heathens and slaves.”8 Legislators passed a series of
measures, including the foreign miners’ tax, commutation tax, and the police tax, all aimed at
Chinese workers.9 Meanwhile, the anti-Chinese movement uniquely targeted Chinese women.
Legislators further portrayed Chinese women as a threat to Victorian-era attitudes about sexuality.
They often cast Chinese women as “prostitutes,” pointing to practices of polygamy, prostitution,
adultery, and domestic servitude as evidence of deviance and “immorality.” 10
In the face of anti-Chinese discrimination and violence, some Chinese immigrants returned
to China; others developed alliances to creatively use the press, politics, and the courts to challenge

7

Treaty of Peace, Amity, and Commerce (Burlingame-Seward Treaty), China-U.S., art. VI, July 28, 1868, 16 Stat.
739; see Paul Yin, The Narratives of Chinese-American Litigation During the Chinese Exclusion Era, 19 ASIAN AM.
L. J. 145, 147 (2012).
8
Ngai, supra note 6 (“Governor John Bigler, facing a tight race for reelection, made an incendiary speech before the
state legislature, claiming that the Chinese, a race of heathens and slaves, were invading the state and threatening its
society of free producers.”).
9
CHARLES J. MCCLAIN, IN SEARCH OF EQUALITY: THE CHINESE STRUGGLE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 47 (1994).
10
Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 641,
643-47 (2005) (describing the use of sexuality and marriage to promote immigration restrictions against Chinese
women). As scholars have pointed out, the term “prostitute” is often pejorative because it is a status-based noun,
equating a person with a crime, and it promotes stigmatization and alienation. See Anita Bernstein, Working Sex
Words, 24 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 221, 228 (2017) (“Calling a person a prostitute ascribes immorality, corruption,
and degradation to her.”). In this chapter, the term is used when a direct quotation from a source or to refer to the
crime of “prostitution.” Otherwise, the term “commercial sex” is used to refer to sex in exchange for something of
value.
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these discriminatory measures.11 San Francisco became an important site of resistance. As laborers
completed construction of the Central Pacific Railroad, thousands relocated to San Francisco,
where they found jobs in the “boot and shoe, woolens, cigar and tobacco, and sewing industries.” 12
By 1870, San Francisco was the home to approximately a quarter of the Chinese immigrant
population in California. At the same time, Chinese laborers, disproportionately men, sparked a
demand for female migration and a bustling market for commercial sex. 13 According to one
estimate, 23.4 percent of Chinese women in San Francisco by 1860 were involved in commercial
sex.14
The expanding commercial sex industry gave rise to concerns about Chinese “slavery.”
Popular understandings of human trafficking, at the time, were quite nascent. Human trafficking
was not yet defined in federal or international law, and no legal protections existed for immigrant
victims of trafficking. As a result, survivors of sex trafficking who entered the United States often
found themselves at the mercy of immigration officials and subject to unbridled, harsh discretion
with no viable immigration avenues.
To be sure, not all Chinese female immigrants in the sex industry were victims of sex
trafficking. From 1849 to 1854, many Chinese women were self-employed. However, from 1854
to 1925, the commercial sex trade became more organized and dangerous, with a complex network

Yin, supra note 7, at 148; MCCLAIN, supra note 9, at 54 (describing the “alacrity with which Chinese residents of
California resorted to the courts when they felt that their interests were threatened by discriminatory legislation.”);
BETH LEW-WILLIAMS, THE CHINESE MUST GO: VIOLENCE, EXCLUSION, AND THE MAKING OF THE ALIEN IN
AMERICA 95 (2018) (commenting on how some Chinese merchants remained to fight anti-Chinese violence, while
others fled).
12
RONALD TAKAKI, A DIFFERENT MIRROR: A HISTORY OF MULTICULTURAL AMERICA 198 (1993)).
13
GYORY, supra note 6, at 230 (“The facilities that sent Chinese men to Gold Mountain also made it possible for
women to go, whether voluntarily or involuntarily.”).
14
SUCHENG CHAN, THIS BITTERSWEET SOIL 59 (1986). Such surveys have been criticized as inaccurate because
those who conducted the survey often labeled Chinese women who were single or failed to list a profession as
“probable prostitutes.” Abrams, supra note 10, at 656; Lucie Cheng Hirata, Free, Indentured, Enslaved: Chinese
Prostitutes in Nineteenth-Century America, 5 WOMEN IN LATIN AM. 2, 23 (1979).
11
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of Chinese procurers, importers, and brothel owners profiting from migration of Chinese women.
Many importers were connected to secret criminal gangs, called Tongs, and ran major smuggling
and trafficking routes from Hong Kong to San Francisco. Luring and kidnapping were common
practices.15
Tongs also benefited from poor economic conditions in China and the low status of women.
In the patrilineal and patriarchal Chinese culture of the nineteenth century, practices like
infanticide, abandonment, and sale of female children were common. Poor families often sold
daughters to work in the commercial sex industry or as bonded domestic servants, adopted
children, mistresses, or wives. As a result of these practices, many young Chinese women were
brought to the United States based on false promises or with debt.16 Faced with few economic
opportunities, some were “exploited, abused, and some kept in a state of virtual enslavement by
their masters.”17
In California and elsewhere, instead of devising affirmative rights and protections for
potential victims, legislators tended to stigmatize and blame Chinese women. California legislators
particularly targeted Chinese women for exclusion and punishment. In 1866, the California
legislature declared all Chinese “houses of ill fame” nuisances.18 They invalidated leases to
brothels and made it a misdemeanor offense for landlords to lease properties as brothels. In 1870,
California legislators enacted a law, permitting the government to charge any woman found to be

Hirata, supra note 14, at 9 (“When the agents did not find enough females to fill their orders, they sent subagents
into rural districts to lure or kidnap girls and young women and forward the victims to them at the shipping ports . . .
The baits used included promises of gold, marriage, jobs, or education.”).
16
Id. (examining how many Chinese women came “under a contractual arrangement similar to that described in the
Chinese contract coolie system,” which specified that after engaging in service for some time, she could leave the
business).
17
GYORY, supra note 6, at 226; Hirata, supra note 14, at 6 (“Girls often accepted their sale, however reluctantly, out
of filial loyalty, and most of them were not in a position to oppose their families’ decision.”)
18
Act of Mar. 31, 1866, ch. 505, 1866 Cal. Stat. 641-42. The legislation, entitled “An Act for the Suppression of
Chinese Houses of Ill Fame,” initially targeted Chinese women. GYORY, supra note 6, at 240. Several years later,
the term, “Chinese,” was stricken from the legislation. Act of Feb. 7, 1874, ch. 76, 1874 Cal. Stat. 84.
15
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a “prostitute” with a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment and hefty fines.19 In 1873, this law
was then combined with a provision of the California Political Code, which added “lewd” and
“debauched” women to a broad class of persons, who were barred entry into the United States.20
The law also permitted state immigration officials to determine—in their broad discretion—if a
woman was “lewd” or “debauched”—terms left undefined as if self-evident. And, if they could
not pay a $500 bond, the women were subject to exclusion from the United States. Thus, Chinese
women, especially those with little financial resources, were often caught in a web of punitive,
discriminatory laws with little legal recourse.

The Original Opinion

Against this fractious political and legal landscape, twenty-two Chinese women arrived at
a U.S. port of entry on August 24, 1874. These women undertook a thirty-day voyage from Hong
Kong to San Francisco.21 They travelled with more than 500 Chinese passengers via the steamship
Japan, owned by the Pacific Mail Steamship Company. When the steamship docked in San
Francisco, Rudolph Norwin Piotrowski, the commissioner of immigration and an immigrant
himself, boarded the vessel. 22 He then subjected the Chinese women to a humiliating interrogation
about their marital status, children, and relatives in the United States.23 Finding their responses

19

Act of Mar. 18, 1870, ch. 230, 1870 Cal. Stat. 330, 330-31; see also MCCLAIN, supra note 9, at 56.
Cal. Pol. Code § 2952, as amended; Yin, supra note 7, at 154.
21
Paul A. Kramer, The Case of the 22 Lewd Chinese Women, SLATE (Apr. 23, 2012, 3:22 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2012/04/arizonas-immigration-law-at-the-supreme-court-lessons-for-s-b-1070via-the-case-of-the-22-lewd-chinese-women.html.
22
Transcript of Record at 4, Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875) [hereinafter Transcript of Record].
23
Id. at 6-7 (“The questions which I gave them were generally where they were married; if they had any relatives or
companions when they came here; or why&by [sic] what means they came.”).
20
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“perfectly not satisfactory,” he determined that they were “lewd,” detained the women, and
ordered them sent back to Hong Kong.24
One day later, an individual—accounts differ as to whether he was a wealthy merchant or
a perpetrator of human trafficking 25— hired Leander Quint, an attorney and former judge, to file
a writ of habeas corpus in the California District Court. The writ was filed on behalf of one of the
detained Chinese women, Ah Fook. In the writ, the petitioner asserted that Ah Fook was entitled
to land and reside in California under the Burlingame-Seward Treaty and the U.S. Constitution. 26
In the animated four-day trial that followed, the government and counsel for the twentytwo women offered strident arguments on prominent issues of the day, ranging from the balance
of state and federal power, the perils of discretion, Chinese “slavery,” and women’s rights.27 The
women testified, denying any involvement in commercial sex.28 Meanwhile, state witnesses,
lacking any direct evidence that the women were “lewd” or “debauched,” pointed to the women’s
clothing, consisting of handkerchiefs on their heads and bright colored silk-embroidered garments,
to justify their suspicions. 29 In response, Judge Robert F. Morrison ultimately upheld the California

24

Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 276-277.
Newspaper accounts raise questions about the identity of the person who filed the writ. See MCCLAIN, supra note
9, at 57 n.59. The Examiner, a newspaper, described two Chinese people, Ah You and Tom Poy, who made the
application for the writ. Id. (citing Examiner, Aug. 25, 1874, p. 3, col. 4). In contrast, The Daily Alta, a local
newspaper, referenced Ah Lung, who was reportedly a perpetrator of trafficking, as filing it. Id. (citing Daily Alta,
Aug. 26, 1874, p. 1, col. 3). The trial transcript references Chy Lung as filing the writ, and The San Francisco Daily
Union called Chy Lung the “owner of twenty-two Chinese women brought to San Francisco.” Transcript of Record,
supra note 22, at 1; Sacramento Daily Union, Jan. 15, 1878, vol. 1, no. 1. Chy Lung also happens to be a wellknown mercantile company in San Francisco, described as the “the richest merchants of San Francisco, wholesale
dealers in teas, general groceries and dry goods.” However, it is unknown whether the firm had a role in the
litigation or anyone with commercial or other interests in the trafficking or smuggling of Chinese women funded or
participated in the litigation effort. McClain, supra note 9, at 57 n.59; Our Chinese Visitors: Who They Are, What
They Have Come For, and Where They Are, N.Y. TIMES 2 (Aug. 13, 1869).
26
SUCHENG CHAN, ENTRY DENIED: EXCLUSION AND THE CHINESE COMMUNITY IN AMERICA, 1882-1943 100 (1991)
[hereinafter CHAN, ENTRY DENIED].
27
Transcript of Record, supra note 22, at 4.
28
MCCLAIN, supra note 9, at 57. This testimony contradicted testimony by the captain of the vessel, who said that
the women had behaved in an exemplary fashion while on board. Transcript of Record, supra note 22, at 1-4.
29
Kramer, supra note 21.
25
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statute, finding it a permissible exercise of state police power.30 The petitioners then filed a writ to
the Supreme Court of California, which sustained the District Court’s judgment. 31
Subsequently, one of the Chinese women, Ah Fong, filed a writ of habeas corpus in the
federal Circuit Court for the District of California where Supreme Court Justice Stephen Field sat
as a lower court judge. Justice Field, in In re Ah Fong,32 struck down the California statute, finding
the California law to be an overly broad exercise of police power, contrary to the BurlingameSeward Treaty and in violation of the exclusive federal power over intercourse with federal
nations. Significantly, Justice Field held that the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment and
the Civil Rights Act of 1870. This decision was reportedly the first case to articulate such a robust
vision of statutory and constitutional protections for noncitizens.
Justice Field was particularly disturbed by the excesses of state power. He pointed to how
the California statute distinguished in “sweeping” terms “persons widely variant in character.”
While the state retained certain powers, including the right to self-defense, Justice Field found that
the right to control immigration resided solely with the federal government. While the state could
permissibly engage in “vigorous enforcement” of laws, it could not unilaterally discriminatorily
exclude Chinese women.33
Justice Field also affirmed that the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment applied to
any person, rather than only to U.S. citizens. Field proclaimed that, “[d]iscriminating and partial
legislation, favoring particular persons, or against particular persons of the same class, is now
prohibited.”34 He acknowledged the reality of rampant discrimination against Chinese immigrants.

30

Id.
MCCLAIN, supra note 9, at 58-59.
32
In re Ah Fong, 1 F. Cas. 213 (C.C.D. Cal. 1874).
33
Id. at 217.
34
In re Ah Fong, 1 F. Cas. at 218.
31
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Furthermore, Field, in a novel move, applied the Civil Rights Act of 1870, a federal statute that
applied to a discriminatory tax or charge, to state action. He found that the bond requirement in
the California statute imposed an undue burden on Chinese immigrants and that this provision
could be interpreted as a “charge” under the Civil Rights Act of 1870. As it unequally burdened
Chinese women, Field held that it violated federal law.35
As Field issued the oral opinion, Field ended his reading by suggesting that the government
file a writ of error to the Supreme Court. The government, however, failed to appeal or even submit
a brief in Chy Lung. Eventually, the petitioner filed a writ, and two years later, the court issued a
decision. In 1875, Justice Samuel Miller, writing for the unanimous Supreme Court in Chy Lung,
struck down the California law.36 But, he employed strikingly different reasoning than Justice
Field.
Justice Miller expressed grave concerns about state corruption and abuse of power. 37 The
Court observed the growing power of state officials, like Piotrowski, who, armed with the
California law, can “compel them to submit to systematic extortion of the grossest kind.”38 Justice
Miller found that the California law was a recipe for discretionary excesses. By allowing the
commissioner to label any young woman as “lewd” if they had improper manners, Justice Miller
observed that the California law granted vast, unfettered power to state immigration officials. As
a result, the Court found that the federal government, not the states, had the exclusive power to
make laws related to immigration and foreign relations. Justice Miller notably remained silent on
the application of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Civil Rights Act of 1870.39 In doing so, he
35

Id.
Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 281. While Justice Miller identifies the petitioner as Chy Lung, it is believed that Chy Lung
might have been a perpetrator of trafficking or a wealthy merchant who had taken an interest in the litigation. CHAN,
ENTRY DENIED, supra note 26, at 104 n.31.
37
Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 280.
38
Id. at 278.
39
Id. at 279.
36
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failed to consider the federal government’s constitutional obligation to ensure the equal protection
of laws, and the potential for the federal government to engage in discriminatory excesses against
immigrants of the kind he condemned as state abuse of power. In fact, this is precisely what
occurred.

The Feminist Judgment

Professor Chang, writing as Justice Miller, alters the majority opinion by reviving Justice
Field’s analysis in In re Ah Fong. Chang relies on the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights
Act of 1870 to find that the California statute impermissibly discriminates against Chinese women
on the basis of their national origin and sex. He resurrects the history of Section 16 of the Civil
Rights Act to support a wide-ranging interpretation of the federal statute to protect against antiChinese discrimination at the border. As Chang notes, the Chinese community in San Francisco
mobilized to pass Section 16 to address discriminatory anti-Chinese legislation in California. 40
Indeed, Senator Stewart of Nevada had introduced the legislation to extend civil rights not only to
Chinese immigrants, but to all persons. While Section 16 centered on economic legislation, like
the miner’s tax or police tax,41 Chang persuasively argues that this provision should apply to the
California law because the California bond amounts to a “charge” under federal law.
Chang also reengages with then-existing precedent to support a more expansive vision of
the Fourteenth Amendment, one that would offer more generous protections for Chinese women
against discriminatory state action. While the Supreme Court in the Slaughterhouse Cases (1873)

MCCLAIN, supra note 9, at 565-67. Chinese leaders remained focused on three primary injustices, first the miner’s
tax that violated the Burlingame-Seward Treaty, second the commutation tax, and third the ban on Chinese
testimony in U.S. courts. Id. at 565.
41
Id. at 566.
40
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adopted a very limited interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Chang applies the dissent’s
approach to equal protection. In a dissenting opinion of the Slaughterhouse Cases, Justice Field
reads the Fourteenth Amendment’s promises of equal protection and due process to apply to all
persons, regardless of citizenship. Chang applies Field’s analysis and then expands it to reach
discrimination on the basis of sex, an approach which the Supreme Court would not adopt until
nearly a century later.
Chang also artfully brings to the foreground the social, economic, and cultural backdrop
that brought about the anti-Chinese California legislation. He describes how the BurlingameSeward Treaty was negotiated to benefit American white industrialists, many of whom were
former plantation owners who would benefit from the “steady flow of low-cost Chinese immigrant
labor” to meet labor shortages. As the railroads were completed, white public opinion embraced
anti-Chinese racism, viewing the Chinese as a “threat to domestic labor” and pushing expeditiously
for discriminatory laws to effectuate their exclusion and expulsion. Chang also shows how the
California law in question was tied to earlier efforts to tax the Chinese, limit Chinese immigration,
and restrict their ability to testify or effectively challenge discriminatory laws. Thus, he argues that
the California law in Chy Lung should be viewed alongside these other calculated efforts to
discriminate against Chinese immigrants.
The Chang opinion also highlights how concerns about Chinese “slavery” in the late
nineteenth century did little to protect or assist potential victims. The California law in Chy Lung
failed to protect Chinese women who were victims of trafficking. Instead, it targeted potential
victims with exclusion, casting them back into the hands of perpetrators. The California law,
moreover, did nothing to address the “men who might be traffickers.” It also failed to provide
potential victims of human trafficking with protection from deportation or potential “redress.”
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Such affirmative protections would not emerge for another hundred years, when Congress defined
trafficking in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000.42

Conclusion

Had Professor Chang’s reasoning been accepted in 1875, it would have strengthened the
constitutional rights of Chinese immigrants against both state and federal action. Instead, the Chy
Lung decision ultimately set the stage for the rise of federal immigration power and increasingly
harsh gendered and racialized enforcement measures aimed at Chinese immigrants. Almost
immediately, Congress passed the Page Act, which permitted federal immigration officials to
exclude noncitizens who enter “for lewd and immoral purposes.”43 The law would ultimately
expand the federal government’s power to exclude Chinese women based on mere suspicion of
involvement in commercial sex.44 Congress then passed the Immigration Act of 1882, the first
race-based federal exclusion law, which significantly restricted the entry of all Chinese laborers.45
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act in Chae Chan Ping in 1889.46 Thus,
while the decision in Chy Lung called out the harms of official discretion, it did little to change the
realities of persistent anti-Chinese discrimination that would remain embedded in federal
immigration law.

42

See TVPA, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 102(b)(2), 115 Stat. 1464 (2000). In the TVPA, Congress recognized that
immigrant victims often “are repeatedly punished more harshly than the traffickers themselves,” and established the
“T visa,” a special immigration protection for trafficking survivors. TVPA, Preamble.
43
Ch. 141, 18 Stat. pt. 3, 477-487. Some believe that the law was drafted with Field’s decision in Ah Fong in mind.
See MCCLAIN, supra note 9, at 62 n. 83.
44
Ngai, supra note 6.
45
Immigration Act of 1882, 22 Stat. 214 (Aug. 3, 1882).
46
Chan Chae Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
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Still, the Chy Lung case offers important lessons about resistance. Chy Lung was ultimately
a victory for the twenty-two women detained. It marked the first win by a Chinese litigant before
the Supreme Court. While it would not put an end to anti-Chinese racism or violence, it was one
victory that would punctuate a decades-long struggle by Chinese immigrants for the right to
remain, immigrate, and live safely in the United States.
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